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I
n Australia, unhealthy diet is the biggest 
contributor to the burden of disease.1 
As the pivotal agent in the food supply 
chain, the food industry has a major inluence 
on the population’s consumption of food 
products and on population diets.2,3 The 
industry’s substantial economic power, 
particularly through large transnationals, also 
translates readily into political inluence.2-5 
For example, representatives from large food 
companies are reportedly able to establish 
relationships with key policy makers and 
lobby governments for policies that are 
favourable to the company.4 The corporate 
political activity (CPA) of the food industry, 
a term derived from the tobacco control 
and the business literature, describes six 
strategies designed to inluence policies and 
public opinion in favour of the industry.6,7 
These strategies include: information and 
messaging; inancial incentives; constituency 
building; policy substitution; legal 
strategies; opposition fragmentation and 
destabilisation4 (see Table 1 for a description 
of each strategy). 
A company is said to use CPA for three main 
reasons, all designed to increase or protect 
their proits: to gain an advantage in its 
sector; to defend its products or actions; 
and/or to inluence public policies, directly 
or indirectly.8 While CPA is common and 
acceptable from a business perspective, as 
part of eforts to maximise shareholder value,7 
the CPA of the food industry could also have 
the unintended, or in some cases intended, 
efect of undermining eforts to prevent 
and control diet-related non-communicable 
diseases (NCDs).2,4,5,9 
Indeed, the political inluence of the food 
industry has been recognised as a major 
obstacle to NCD prevention eforts.5 While the 
CPA of the tobacco industry has been studied 
for many decades,10-12 assisted by access to 
internal documents,13,14 the food industry’s 
CPA has not been investigated in great detail.4 
In Australia, previous analyses have shown 
that the CPA of major food industry actors 
include a diverse range of strategies.15,16 
However, these analyses mainly relied on 
public information and the experiences of 
relevant stakeholders were not explored.
This study aimed to gain deeper insight into 
the CPA of the Australian food industry from a 
public health perspective, through interviews 
with current and former policy makers, 
public health advocates and academics who 
have closely interacted with food industry 
representatives or observed food industry 
behaviours. 
Methods
For this project, researchers aligned their 
work with the critical social science approach. 
The food industry was considered as a 
potential determinant of health and was 
studied from a public health perspective. 
This its within the ield of research on the 
inluence of corporations, more generally, on 
health.17-19 The critical approach informed the 
way data were collected, analysed and results 
reported in this paper. This work was part of 
eforts to improve the accountability of the 
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Abstract
Objective: To gain deeper insight into the corporate political activity (CPA) of the Australian 
food industry from a public health perspective.
Methods: Fifteen interviews with a purposive sample of current and former policy makers, 
public health advocates and academics who have closely interacted with food industry 
representatives or observed food industry behaviours. 
Results: All participants reported having directly experienced the CPA of the food industry 
during their careers, with the ‘information and messaging’ and ‘constituency building’ strategies 
most prominent. Participants expressed concern that food industry CPA strategies resulted in 
weakened policy responses to addressing diet-related disease. 
Conclusions: This study provides direct evidence of food industry practices that have the 
potential to shape public health-related policies and programs in Australia in ways that favour 
business interests at the expense of population health. 
Implications for public health: This evidence can inform policy makers and public health 
advocates and be used to adopt measures to ensure that public interests are put at the 
forefront as part of the policy development and implementation process.
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food industry, through the work of INFORMAS 
(International Network for Food and Obesity/
NCD Research, Monitoring and Action 
Support) – an initiative that aims to monitor 
and benchmark public and private sector 
actions to create healthy food environments 
and reduce obesity and NCDs.20
A purposive sample was recruited from 
a pool of participants identiied for their 
potential to provide detailed insight and 
irst-hand experience into the CPA of the 
food industry. Potential participants were 
identiied by examining published authors 
in the relevant academic literature, and 
through their involvement in, or public 
commentary on, the development and/
or implementation of public health-
related policies and programs based on 
the experience of the authors. Additional 
participants were identiied using a snowball 
sampling method. People currently working 
within the food industry were excluded from 
the study because the authors felt that the 
commercial perspectives they were likely to 
ofer, and the constraints (e.g. non-disclosure 
or conidentiality agreements) that they were 
likely to be under, would not allow them to 
contribute substantially to the research aim. 
Initial contact with potential participants 
was by email, with follow-up by email or 
phone call. All contact details were retrieved 
from potential participant’s websites or the 
websites of their organisations. 
Single semi-structured interviews with 
open-ended questions were conducted by 
MM. Fifteen participants were interviewed 
between November 2014 and February 2015. 
Participants included a former chief minister/
State Premier (n=1), a former Minister of 
Health (State/Territory level) (n=1), other 
former or current senior staf of government 
agencies (n=3), senior executive oicers of 
relevant not-for-proit organisations (n=4), 
academics (n=4), a nutritionist (n=1) and a 
former senior manager from a food industry 
organisation (n=1). One person declined 
to participate. Participants provided their 
written informed consent and consent for the 
discussions to be digitally recorded. MM also 
took ield notes during the interviews.
The interview guide was pilot tested prior 
to data collection (a copy of the interview 
guide is provided in the supplementary 
ile). Interviews were administered either 
face-to-face at the workplace of participants 
or through Skype or phone calls, and lasted 
about one hour each. This approach was 
considered the most cost-efective way 
to reach participants across Australia. All 
interviews were conducted and transcribed 
(semi-verbatim transcription) by MM. 
Transcripts were provided to participants for 
their comments and corrections on request. 
In this paper, only general identiiers for 
participants are employed, including 
generic terms such as ‘her’ or ‘she’ to refer to 
both female and male participants and, for 
example, ‘public health advocate’ to describe 
the professional position of the participant. 
In cases where participants had multiple 
diferent roles throughout their careers, such 
as policy maker and academic, participants 
are identiied using the role most relevant to 
the example they were describing. Interviews 
were collected until data saturation was 
reached, deined as the point where no new 
codes emerged from the subsequent analysis 
of interviews. 
A qualitative thematic analysis was 
undertaken by the interviewer, MM, and data 
was re-analysed by another researcher, GS, 
to ensure inter-coder reliability. Data were 
managed using NVivo software. Themes were 
identiied from a proposed framework for 
classifying the CPA of the food industry.4 The 
framework was adapted to include any new 
themes emerging from the data (iterative 
process). The only new CPA practice identiied 
through this study was, ‘Creating antagonism 
between professionals’, and was classiied 
under the ‘opposition fragmentation and 
destabilisation’ strategy. Illustrative examples 
are presented in this paper, classiied under 
the themes proposed in the framework. 
For each strategy, evidence provided by 
participants was compared with data 
obtained from a previous study, which was 
based only on an analysis of publicly-available 
information, investigating CPA strategies of 
the food industry in Australia.21 
This research was approved by the Human 
Ethics Advisory Group of the Faculty of 
Health at Deakin University, Australia (project 
number HEAG-H 145_2014).
Results
Five of the six CPA strategies were observed 
by participants. ‘Legal strategies’ were not 
described during the interviews.
When discussing the CPA of the Australian 
food industry, in a general sense and from 
a public health perspective, participants 
highlighted the fact that, by nature, the food 
industry and public health advocates often 
have diferent objectives:
“They are all strategies that don’t have public 
health as the underlying outcome. The 
outcome certainly is more about money and 
the inancial [beneit] of the company, rather 
than other community outcomes, such as 
public health.” [Senior manager at a public 
health-related not-for-proit organisation]
“Their starting point is perfectly reasonably, 
maximising shareholder value, maximising 
proits. And that’s a very diferent starting 
point from public health, where the objective 
is to maximise the public health outcomes. 
And the two, unfortunately, are not at all 
aligned in many cases.” [Academic]
Information and messaging strategy
Participants reported experiencing the 
‘information and messaging’ strategy in 
Table 1: Description of CPA strategies and related practices, based on Mialon et al.4
CPA strategies Description and related practices
Information and 
messaging
The information strategy includes practices through which the industry disseminates information that is likely 
to be beneicial to its activities in order to inluence public health-related policies and outcomes in ways that 
are in their favour. This strategy includes: lobbying policy makers; stressing the economic importance of the 
industry; promoting deregulation; framing the debate on diet- and public health-related issues; shaping the 
evidence base on diet and public health-related issues.
Financial incentives Through the inancial incentives strategy, the industry provides funds, gifts and other incentives to politicians, 
political parties and other decision makers.
Constituency 
building
The constituency building strategy aims to gain the favour of public opinion as well as other key stakeholders, 
such as the media and the public health community. This strategy includes: establishing relationships with key 
opinion leaders and health organisations; seeking involvement in the community; establishing relationships 
with policymakers; establishing relationships with the media.
Legal strategies In this strategy, the industry uses legal action (or the threat thereof) against public policies or opponents. The 
industry may also attempt to inluence the development of trade and investment agreements in their favour.
Policy substitution When threatened by regulation, the industry proposes alternatives, such as voluntary initiatives or self-
regulation. 
Opposition 
fragmentation and 
destabilisation
The constituency fragmentation and destabilisation strategy refers to practices employed by the industry to 
fragment and destabilise groups or individuals that have criticised or are likely to oppose a company’s products 
or practices or policies that may adversely impact on the company.
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Australia on many occasions. Within this 
strategy, participants identiied that the 
food industry used many diferent practices, 
such as lobbying of policy makers; stressing 
the economic importance of the industry; 
promoting deregulation; framing the debate; 
and shaping the evidence base on diet and 
public health related issues. 
Lobbying
Instances of lobbying were observed in 
previous analysis in Australia.15 For this study, 
some participants explained that staf from 
the food industry regularly met with policy 
makers in Australia:
“They certainly do lobby the policy makers, 
both directly and indirectly. My experience as 
a [senior position in the government] made 
that very clear. But I also watched [name of a 
lobbyist] and [his/her] very efective lobbying 
of policy makers – ensuring that they had a 
private invitation to dinner, that there will be 
meetings at the press club [that] politicians 
might like to come to. [He/she] would invite 
them and pay for them to [attend] those [sorts 
of meetings], as [his/her] guests.” [Former 
senior policy maker]
Stress the industry’s economic importance 
Participants conirmed that, as described in 
a previous study,15 ‘stressing the economic 
importance of the industry’ was an argument 
used by the food industry when it was at risk 
of having its products or actions regulated.
“[Stressing the economic importance of the 
industry] still seems to get a bit of traction, 
any time there is any suggestion of increasing 
regulation. We saw more of that when (…) 
there was a lot more threat that there was 
going to be either regulation imposed, for 
example, or policies that might have an 
impact on food businesses. So, we saw a bit 
more of that framing coming out around 
the role of industry in employing and having 
to move … [operations] of-shore and that 
sort of thing.” [Senior manager at a public 
health-related not-for-proit organisation]
One participant mentioned that the 
economic importance of the food industry, by 
itself, and without the need for the industry to 
stress it, could be a major factor inluencing 
decision makers:
“Because they are a big industry, they are 
implicitly a large taxpayer and employer, and 
therefore important to government, so they 
have a lot of clout. So that’s not that they are 
necessarily giving money to political parties, 
but, because of their size, they are important.” 
[Academic]
Promotion of deregulation
Participants provided diferent examples 
of arguments used by the food industry to 
promote deregulation. The primary argument 
that was regulation will be a cost to the 
industry and that jobs will be lost. These 
were similar to information found in previous 
studies.15
One participant explained that:
“The sky will fall in [when there is the 
suggestion of regulation], or, you know, 
everybody will lose their jobs. That’s the classic 
argument [made by the food industry].” 
[Former senior manager at public health-
related not-for-proit organisation]
Importantly, some participants suggested 
that the Australian government and citizens 
probably support the industry arguments:
“It’s different parts of the government: for 
example, the agriculture sector very strongly 
promotes deregulation and stresses the 
importance of the food industry in term of 
number of jobs supported. When we have 
a federal nutrition policy, it’s all about the 
economic aspects of it, rather than the 
nutrition aspect.” [Former industry staff 
member]
“They [food industry] have a specific 
technique that they use; it’s the term ‘the 
nanny state’. It is a very efective term. (…) It’s 
the way they are framing the debate, and it 
rings true with Australians, they don’t want 
too much government interference.” [Former 
senior policy maker]
Frame the debate on diet and public health 
related issues
Participants shared many examples of the 
industry trying to ‘frame the debate on diet 
and public health related issues’. As with 
previous evidence from publicly available 
information,15 the industry: shifted the blame 
away from themselves in relation to the 
non-communicable disease (NCD) epidemic 
(e.g. by focusing on personal responsibility); 
promoted the good intentions and stressed 
the good traits of the food industry (e.g. 
saying that the industry produces legal and 
safe products); and emphasised its actions 
to address public health-related issues (e.g. 
saying that it is ‘part of the solution’).
Some participants mentioned speciic 
examples, such as a campaign by Coca Cola:
“The Coca Cola campaign – ‘we are part of the 
solution’ – that very much focuses on physical 
activity and the role of individuals and parents 
– that’s a perfect example of [the way that the 
food industry frames the debate].” [Senior 
manager at a public health-related not-for-
proit organisation]
One of the points of tension between food 
industry and public health representatives 
was the use of evidence to defend a particular 
position. One participant explained that some 
arguments used by the food industry were 
not necessarily based on evidence:
 “I’ve sat through many meetings where I’ve 
heard the food industry extend the view that 
‘this is personal responsibility’, ‘there is no such 
thing as a bad food’, ‘every food is part of a 
balanced diet’. These are all sayings that really 
haven’t got any science behind them, but 
are designed to exonerate the food industry.” 
[Academic]
One participant identiied that the discourse 
of the food industry was aligned with that of 
the Australian government:
“I have seen [the food industry shift the 
blame for NCDs away from themselves] and, 
that’s a strong philosophical position of the 
government at the moment (…). They focus 
on individual responsibility. (…) [A] classic 
example I can see there is [when the food 
industry] says, “Well, what we produce is 
legal”, and we’ve actually had Tony Abbott 
coming out, the [then] Prime Minister, coming 
out and saying “yes, they are producing legal 
substances” (…). So stressing that what they 
produce is not illegal.” [Academic]
Shape the evidence base on diet and public 
health-related issues
Many participants described the ways in 
which the food industry tried to shape the 
evidence base on diet and public health-
related issues in Australia. This practice was 
also reported in previous analyses.15 
For example, one participant explained that 
the food industry did not systematically 
follow international research standards:
“The food industry does publish, but it’s grey 
literature of their results; and that gets equal 
air time to peer-reviewed public health 
reports. (…) I think it’s unfair (…). And there 
are [food industry] reports that certainly 
seem to be commissioned to get the results 
that the food industry wants, reports that 
are quite inluential with decision makers. 
(…) [These reports use] quite emotive words, 
and certainly link back to how it would be 
detrimental to go down the path of some 
of the regulation that we are pushing for, 
because it is not needed, and because it 
costs money, and that sort of thing.” [Senior 
manager at a public health-related not-for-
proit organisation]
Participants identiied that the food industry 
cherry-picked evidence that suits its position 
and tried to promote it to the public health 
community and to policy makers:
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“If they ind an article that they think we need 
to know about, and it supports their case, 
and it looks pretty impressive and is in a peer 
reviewed journal, they will send it through [to 
policy makers]. The dairy industry does that 
very efectively.” [Public servant]
One participant mentioned the role of 
nutrition professionals working in the food 
industry who present their views in the 
media:
“There are even some of those nutrition 
professionals who do work with the food 
industry becoming quite vocal in the media 
about [a recent public health program 
under development] as well, bringing that 
industry-lavoured position into the public 
arena, which really is unhelpful from a 
perspective of trying to give the community 
clear and unbiased advice, when we, as a 
nutrition community, appear to be debating 
among ourselves, where some people in the 
nutrition community are actually coming 
from a particular industry standpoint.” 
[Senior manager at a public health-related 
not-for-proit organisation]
Another participant explained that industry 
involvement in research at her institution 
had an inluence on the media strategy of 
her research group. This participant gave 
the example of how her research group 
deliberately did not put out a media release 
regarding one of her publications out of 
concern for how a food industry partner 
might react to the results.
Financial incentives strategy
Even though previous data analysis found 
evidence of the ‘inancial incentive’ strategy,15 
most participants did not have irst-hand 
experience of this strategy. However, 
some provided details about gifts they 
received from the food industry during 
their professional careers, or examples of 
circumstances in which funds from the food 
industry were provided to policy makers or 
public health advocates:
 “When an industry provides funds to 
political parties to help them get elected, the 
politicians don’t completely sell their souls, 
but what it does do is it invariably gives them 
access to the politicians and better access. 
(…). I have actually been on a cabinet (…) 
where two of the politicians said ‘well, we 
can’t do that because this is actually one of 
the major donors to our party’, so I actually 
witnessed that statement.” [Former senior 
policy maker]
“I was invited once to go and talk (…) at [a] 
conference (…), and I’d said yes, and [the 
organiser] paid for my airfare. When I got 
there, in the introduction for me, they said 
that my airfare had been paid by a particular 
industry group. They didn’t even tell me [who 
the funder was]. So I was furious. (…) I felt 
almost ambushed that they had said they 
paid the airfare, but never had they even 
said ‘oh we are actually covering it from this 
particular global company’. So sometimes 
they don’t even tell you.” [Academic]
It is important to note that participants 
viewed this strategy as one of the less 
prevalent and least inluential in terms 
of public health, due to the existence of 
generally strong processes with respect to 
declaration of inancial incentives, and the 
cultural unacceptability of any forms of actual 
or perceived bribery in Australia. For example, 
participants explained that:
“We are not allowed, as public servants, so 
to speak, to receive gifts or entertainment 
or inancial inducements.” [Current public 
servant]
And:
“One of the major problems with that is that, 
invariably, you get found out and you look 
really, really bad. If it looks like you tried to 
bribe somebody, whether it’s efective or not, 
to most of the world it looks like the wrong 
thing.” [Former industry staf member]
Constituency building strategy
Participants shared many examples of the 
‘constituency building strategy’ during the 
interviews.
Establish relationships with key health 
organisations and opinion leaders
As indicated in publicly available 
information,15 participants noted strong 
relationships between the food industry 
and key health organisations in Australia, 
as well as with opinion leaders. Participants 
expressed concerns regarding these 
relationships because they could provide 
‘credibility by association’ for the food 
industry. For example, participants described:
“The Nutrition Society of Australia, the 
Dieticians Association, if you have a look at 
their conferences, and have a look at their 
sponsors, they have an extraordinary range 
of sponsors, from basically all the junk food 
companies – they [the food industry] get 
credibility by association.” [Former senior 
policy maker]
“It’s a really bad view; it undermines the 
perception of the integrity of the profession 
when there are industry groups clearly 
contributing financially to a [scientific] 
conference, or even just being there.” 
[Academic]
Seek involvement in the community
Many participants provided examples of food 
companies in Australia seeking involvement 
in the community. Most of these examples 
were identiied in previous studies.15 
The Ronald McDonald House, a charity 
operated by McDonald’s that provides 
support to families with hospitalised children, 
was mentioned by several participants as 
potentially having a negative inluence on 
public health in the long term as it promotes 
positive perceptions of McDonald’s among 
policy makers and in the community. One 
participant observed for example that:
“They’d say [Ronald McDonald House] is a 
charity, but it’s not really a charity, it’s an arm 
of McDonald’s. It’s there as part of McDonald’s 
public relations strategy that proves they’re 
part of the solution.” [Former public servant]
Other notable examples identiied by 
participants included: the Nestlé roadshow 
running in the school holidays in major 
shopping centres “where they’re supporting 
parents around putting more vegetables and 
getting children to drink more milk, but it’s 
really promoting their Maggi noodles and 
Milo to parents” [Senior manager at a public 
health-related not-for-proit organisation]; 
the Food Bank, where the food industry 
contributes with its products; AusKick, the 
Australian Rules Football program for kids, 
where children “had to go to McDonald’s 
to pick up their uniforms and materials” 
[Academic].
Establish relationships with policymakers
The practice by which the food industry 
established relationships with policy makers 
was one of the most commonly observed by 
participants. Many reported that they had the 
opportunity to witness this practice directly, 
and so they provided more details than what 
was found in publicly available information.15 
For example, a participant explained:
“One of the food industry people said to me, 
as we walked along the corridor of Parliament 
House, ‘you can say what you like, we’ve got 
friends in high places’, which [she/he] did 
have.” [Nutritionist]
Several participants said the relationships 
between food industry representatives and 
policy makers undermined the development 
of efective public health policies. Mentioning 
the example of a working group on a diet-
related issue that included food company staf 
members, one participant commented that: 
Mialon et al.
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“The [public health policy], that’s a very good 
example of the food industry having quite 
an inluence and being at a level table with 
public health […]. My impression is that they 
weren’t as committed in the end to the results 
as they said at the start of the meetings. […] 
So they might have equal numbers, but they 
certainly seemed to hold the whole results 
ransom – because, in the end, it’s reliant on 
them taking it up (…), whereas public health 
doesn’t have anything to hold anyone to 
ransom for.” [Senior manager at a public 
health-related not-for-proit organisation]
Participants provided evidence that some 
Australian policy makers working in public 
health went to work for the food industry and 
some from the food industry went to work 
in the government, a practice referred to as 
the ‘revolving door’. This was not identiied 
in previous studies.15 For example, one 
participant explained her view on one such 
incident:
“In Australia, when we had [name withheld] 
on [the board of a major national government 
health initiative], when she moved from [a 
senior appointment with a health-related 
body] to [a senior position with a food-
industry organisation], and still retained 
her seat on the [board of the major national 
government health initiative], then that was 
a really bad move, because she had a clear 
conlict of interest. And then she exerted that 
inluence, and she was the keynote at a whole 
lot of various events, she got a platform as 
someone who has a voice in public health. 
(…) I feel that she definitely would have 
pushed the processed food industry’s interest, 
because that was what she was being paid 
to do.” [Senior manager at a public health-
related not-for-proit organisation]
Participants provided other examples of the 
‘revolving door’ in Australia:
“The Head of Regulatory Afairs at the Food 
and Grocery Council is an ex Food Standards 
Australia and New Zealand [a government 
agency] – so often they [the food industry] 
recruit senior public civil servants into their 
organisations, because of their linkages and 
relationships.” [Senior manager at a public 
health-related not-for-proit organisation]
“All the experienced public health nutritionists 
in the [State-government] Health Department 
have been moved into the therapeutic goods 
administration or alcohol [area]. (…) I can 
think of three examples where nutritionist 
that actually have strong links to the food 
industry have recently been appointed to 
[positions in] the Department..” [Academic]
Establish relationships with the media
The ‘establishment of relationships between 
the food industry and the media’ was 
observed to a limited extent by participants. 
One participant explained:
“They [the food industry] have ofered plenty 
of reporters trips to conferences, where they’ve 
reported. It’s quite nice, you’re getting a free 
trip to a conference, which is in a luxury hotel 
somewhere in a nice place. (…) I’m sure it 
changes people’s perception of the product.” 
[Former public servant]
Another commented that her career had 
been afected by these relationships:
“With one of those magazines [I used to write 
in], when the editor called me to say they 
couldn’t use me anymore, because it meant 
they wouldn’t get any advertising from the 
[food industry], [he/she] said ‘if you ever say 
anything about this publicly, I will deny it’. I 
thought that was particularly dirty.” [Former 
public servant]
Policy substitution strategy
All of the 15 participants interviewed as part 
of this study observed, to some extent, the 
‘policy substitution’ strategy. This strategy 
was also identiied in publicly available 
information.15 They mentioned the voluntary 
initiatives led by the Australian Food and 
Grocery Council: the ‘Responsible Marketing 
to Children Initiative’, the ‘Quick Service 
Restaurants Initiative’ and the ‘Daily Intake 
Guide’. Participants bemoaned the lack of 
formal monitoring of these initiatives and 
generally described them as ‘a distraction’ 
from government-led policy progress. Several 
participants talked about the Food and 
Health Dialogue, a previous collaboration 
between the Australian government and 
the food industry to improve food products, 
commenting that they saw the initiative as a 
way for all parties to avoid regulation. 
A participant summarised what most people 
interviewed expressed during this study:
“There has been a lot of pressure for regulation 
and the food industry came up with their 
codes (…), and that was fairly obviously to 
ill a gap that was going to get illed by the 
government if they didn’t. And they since 
changed those [codes] slightly as well, to 
keep up with the time, give the impression 
that they are adapting and changing them 
to meet the [current] needs. And then they sell 
that as being a cost-efective measure that 
saves the government money and saves the 
industry money, and is just as efective, that’s 
how they sell it.” [Senior manager at a public 
health-related not-for-proit organisation]
Legal strategies
‘Legal strategies’, through which the industry 
sues its opponents, challenges regulations 
in courts, and inluences the development 
of trade or investment agreements were not 
reported by participants. Only one example 
of the use of legal strategies was previously 
identiied in relation to the food industry in 
Australia.15 
Opposition destabilisation and 
fragmentation strategy
In Australia, almost all participants 
mentioned their exposure to the ‘opposition 
destabilisation and fragmentation’ strategy, 
a strategy that was not identiied in previous 
studies.15 For example, one participant 
highlighted that the food industry criticised 
public health advocates personally:
“If they [the food industry] ring me or email 
me directly, I feel like there is no protection 
for me. And they can be quite threatening. 
(…) They do feel that they’ve got the right 
to call personally, or contact me personally; 
and I tell them I can’t talk to them and I refer 
them elsewhere. But sometimes that doesn’t 
stop them saying what they want to say.” 
[Academic]
And:
“[They] try to undermine our authority, 
but also in semi-conidential systems that 
actually affect our career and research 
possibilities. I think they’re very, very powerful. 
It sounds like a conspiracy theory (…) but it’s 
real. (…)” [Academic]
One participant explained that, in their 
view, the food industry deliberately created 
antagonism between professionals working 
on the prevention and control of obesity 
with, on one side, people working on 
physical activity and, on the other side, 
people working in nutrition so that they 
debate against each other instead of working 
together.
“They will then get people who argue that 
physical activity is more important than 
nutrition. They basically have the nutritionists 
and the public health people and the physical 
activity people fighting each other. That 
meant neither of them could do anything. 
[…]. So this was a deliberate tactic to get the 
physical activity and the nutrition people 
arguing among themselves so much that 
neither of them could actually do anything.” 
[Nutritionist]
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Discussion
This study provided detailed insight into 
the CPA strategies used by the Australian 
food industry, as viewed through a public 
health lens. Participants revealed that the 
‘information and messaging’, the ‘constituency 
building’, the ‘policy substitution’ and the 
‘opposition fragmentation and destabilisation’ 
strategies have frequently been observed. 
Participants identiied that many of the 
practices of the food industry have inluenced 
policy makers and community attitudes. 
In some cases, such as the ‘promotion of 
deregulation’, some participants felt that 
food industry practices were in line with the 
views of policy makers and the community, 
although it is not clear the extent to which 
the views of these groups have been 
inluenced by the food industry. In most 
cases, such as the way the industry has 
shaped the evidence base on diet and public 
health related issues and the relationships 
between food industry representatives and 
policy makers, participants expressed concern 
that these practices have resulted in policy 
responses that favour business interests over 
public interests and may have undermined 
NCD prevention eforts. 
This study supplemented information from 
a previous study investigating CPA practices 
of the food industry in Australia using only 
publicly available information. The results 
of this study were broadly consistent with 
the indings of the earlier study. However, 
participants in this study shared examples of 
the ‘revolving door’ and of the ‘constituency 
fragmentation and destabilisation’ strategy, 
that were not identiied previously.15 This 
may partly be as a result of the previous work 
focusing on only ive food industry actors. 
In this study, data saturation was reached, 
making it likely that most practices used by 
the food industry in Australia were identiied, 
although speciic examples might remain 
unexplored.
While results from this study are not 
generalisable to other countries, the practices 
identiied in relation to the Australian food 
industry are similar to the practices previously 
identiied in relation to the same industry 
in other countries.22-25 This could be partly 
explained by the fact that many food industry 
actors cited by participants also operate in 
other countries. The CPA practices identiied 
in this study are also comparable to those 
employed by other industries, such as 
tobacco and alcohol.2,19,26 Accordingly, this 
study adds to the growing literature on the 
inluence of corporations on health. 
This study has a number of limitations. 
It relied on the personal experiences of 
participants. Accordingly, the insights ofered 
by participants relect their personal biases 
and perspectives. However, the data obtained 
from participants was compared with data 
collected from publicly available sources,15 
with indings similar across both data sets. 
Critically, this study explicitly adopted a 
public health perspective in considering the 
CPA of the food industry. Other perspectives, 
such as corporate or economic perspectives, 
are likely to result in diferent classiications 
of the industry practices identiied in this 
study. For example, many practices cited in 
this study under the ‘constituency building’ 
strategy could be considered as part of the 
‘social responsibility’ of businesses.27 
Because this study was retrospective, it might 
describe CPA strategies that were used in the 
past only. Moreover, this study did not assess 
in any great detail the extent to which the 
CPA of the food industry actually inluenced 
the decision making process or policy makers.
As part of future eforts to understand the 
CPA of food companies globally, this study 
can be replicated in other countries. This 
study indicates that key informant interviews 
seem to be a useful way to supplement 
analyses of publicly available information 
with respect to CPA. Future investigations 
might beneit from being more targeted 
and could focus on strategies used by food 
companies in respect of speciic public health 
policies or programs under development. 
It is important to note that the CPA of the 
food industry is part of normal business 
practice. For example, lobbying, funding 
of political parties and involvement in the 
community are all acceptable and legitimate 
practices in democratic countries such as 
Australia. However, as this study identiies, 
these practices also represent a risk to public 
health. 
Due to the imperative to improve population 
diets as a matter of urgency, strategies to 
mitigate the risk related to food industry CPA 
need to be investigated and implemented. As 
an example, that could include more detailed 
disclosure of information in the Register 
of Lobbyists in Australia, such as amount 
spent on lobbying and issues discussed. 
Recent eforts by Coca-Cola in Australia, 
the North America and United Kingdom 
to disclose detailed information about the 
research the company supports is a clear and 
commendable step.28-30 
Conclusion
This study has provided direct evidence 
of food industry practices that have the 
potential to shape public health-related 
policies and programs in Australia in ways 
that favour business interests at the expense 
of population health objectives. Policy makers 
and public health advocates can use this 
evidence to adopt measures to ensure that 
public interests are adequately balanced 
with other concerns as part of the policy 
development and implementation process.
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